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0. An action (kriya), according to Paniniyas, is not directly perceived and has to be inferred from its result (phalanumeya-kriya).
To investigate the structure of the inference of an action {kriyanumana) is the aim of this paper." 1.
In early India, a semantic analysis of verbs led to the common understanding that an action is not a single entity but a complex (.samuharupd) of those constituent
•Eaction-moments which, from its commencement up to the accomplishment of its result, occur in a sequence (jiurvdparlbhuta)."
The reason why an action is said to be imperceptible lies in its composite nature, which will be revealed by a By the statement A is meant the inference of an action from the use of a finite verb form like pacati (sabdaprayoga) and by the statement B that from a spatial movement (.de'santaraprapti). The point here, thus, is that an action has the cause-effect relation to the application of the finite verb form and to movement, which enables one to infer an action from these. It is to be noted that one must assume a cause in order to An Action Qtriya) and Its Cognition:
account for the utterance of words, as well as the occurrence of such an event as Devadatta's being in one place at one time and somewhere, else at another, since application of words is said to have meanings for place with yogins only, who are able to perceive a current action at each component instant.
Apart from the question of whether yogins alone are qualified for having the inference of such a kind for an action, it admits of no doubt that the theory of sahkalana makes it possible for one to grasp the causal relationship necessary for inferring an action. Although the action as a complex, without which its result is not to be realized, cannot actually be existent in terms of time and space, one might identify the mental unity with the proper cause for the outcome concerned, insofar as a certain result is observed to follow a complex of action-moments, and these mentally unified moments, which one speaks of as an action, can represent the actual action-moments in a sequence. 3.2.
As has already been suggested, Nagesa holds that nobody can perceive the action-moments except yogins. For him, both a complex of action-moments and the action-moments are beyond perception with ordinary people. Let us then see from this standpoint how the inference for an action can be made. Nagesa [ud. 1.3 
